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A method for ~rnplementing secure personal computing in a network
with one or more cp.ntrsl facilities is described. The method employs
a public-key encryption device and hardware keys. Each user is respon_
sible for his own security and need not rely on the security of the
central facility o~ the communication links.
(1) This work was supported in part by NSF Grant MCS77_04~35.
(2) Computer Science Department. Purdue University, W. Lafayette, IN 47907.
1Introduction
Within the next ten years many of us will have personal computers
1linked to a centrul facility. The central facility (CF) will offer
many attractive features: long term storage, text editors, language proces_
sors, special purpose software, video games, access to large data banks,
and electronic mail foT. communication among users on the network. The
CF could also pos~ a serious threat: any or all of the secrets we entrust
with it could be stolen without our even beiog aware of the theft.
Personal communication sent over the network could be int2rcepted; files
stored in the CF could be copied; boohy-trapped software borrowed from
the CF and run on our personal computers could transmit confidential data
back to its owner via the CF.
This paper de~cribes a simple method for safeguarding personal data
in the network. T~e method evolved from consideration of three basic
premises: user respo"sibility, possibLe security flaws in the CF, and
limited sharing of confidential information among users.
The first premise is that each user should be responsible for the
security of his electronic possessions, just as he is for his other pos~
sessions. He should be able to protect his electronic possessions to the
same-degree and wit~ the same precautions as he protects his other pos_
sessions. For example, several options are available for safeguarding
1. Although I shall ~ssume there is a single central facility, the
security mechani~ms described here apply equally to networks with
multiple central facilities.
2jewelry or important ~~pers: an unlocked drawer, a locked cabinet, a
steel vault, a safe deposit box, etc. One evaluates the risks, cost, and
inconvenience of eac~ ~ption to select the most suitable alternative.
Likewise, I propose a system in which each user can select safeguards
for computer files 3nd communication with roughly similar risks, costs,
and convenience. It is important that the user feel confident in under_
standing the limitati~ns of the safeguards he selects.
The second premise is that a user should not have to rely on or trust
the CF or the communication links of the network for the safety of his
data. The proof of a complex CF should not be a prerequisite for security
to the customers. Even if the CF could be proven secure, ~here would be
no guaran~ee ~ha~ its specifica~ion6were comple~e or ~hat an unsuspected
compromise could not uccur. However, there are strong economic reasons
for the designers of the CF to build a secure and reliable system. An
unreliable or insecure CF will lose its customerst no user will entrust
a CF with files or maii that are subject to accidental (or intential)
loss or destruction. But whereas a user can recognize the loss or destruc_
tion of his data, ilE cannot recognize its theft. Nevertheless, the customers
of the CF must fee'. that their personal data cannot be stolen even in the
presence of hardware faults, software errors, or malicious at~acks.
The third premise is that sharing of confidential information among
users of the CF is limited. In MULTICS, for example, whose design is
based on sharability and whose philosophy encourages sharing, there is
in fact little inte~_user sharing [Mon77]. Consequently, users can share
copies of confidential files rather than originals without straining the
3resources of the cr. Users can share originals of nonconfidential files,
hO·,oIever.
l1y proposal places the responsibility for safeguarding personal
data on the owner~ The security of data stored in the CF or transmitted
through the CF does not depend on the security or correctness of the CF
or the communication links. The principal mechanism is a public_key
encryption device and hardware keys. The mechanism allows 3 user to protect
personal data to the ~~tent that he protects the hardware unit containing
his secret key. The method differs from those described by Popek and
Kline [PoK7S] and N~edham and Schroeder [NeS77] in that both of these
approaches rely on the security and correctness of the network, princi_
pally its key mana~e~nt facilities.
The basic idea was inspired by Tannenbaum's paper [Tan??], which
describes a distributed interactive system wherein each user has his own
dedicated LSI microcomputer. These "personal computersll are each con-
nected to a centra~ minicomputer, which provides file storage and software.
To run a program, a user submits a request to the central machine, which
then sends a copy of the program to the user1s computer for execution.
Tanenbaum's design has considerable merit. The central operating
system is considerably less complex than is customary for large centralized
time-sharing systems. The system supports a heterogeneous network of
microcomputers, enabling it to take advantage of advances in ndcrocomputer
technology. Although Tanenbaum does not discuss data security, the prin_
ciple feature of us~r isolation provides a good basis for implementing
security. The encryption scheme proposed in this paper could complete the
rlc51[.lIo
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1 <..Illl cU~::-C:1tJy investigating the security properties of 11
system patterned Riter Tannenbaum's design.
The following ~ection outlines the mechanism. Subsequent sections
describe how the mechanism solves three important security problems:
personal secrecy, secure communications and sharing, and secure signatures.
A final section outlipes the requirements of the interface with the CP.
In the interest of conveying the basic ideas, I have omitted many details.
5The Security t-lcchil~
The security Ir.ec.hanism consists of an encryption device, which connects
to a personal COIlliJIJter, and hardware keys. The encryption device implements
a public-key encryption algorithm as proposed by Diffie and Hellman [01H76J
and further investigated by Rivest, Shamir,.'and Adleman [RSA78]. Under
publicNkey encryption, a plaintext message is enciphered using a pUblic
key P and deciphered using a secret 2(or private) key s. The encipher
and decipher algori~hros are inverse algorithms over the same message space
and are publicly av~ilable.
Let xY denote t.he enciphering or deciphering of X with key Y. For
a given plaintext message H, the corresponding ciphertext C ~s related to
and
Mby the relations:
C = MP SP = C •
Furthermore, for either plaintext or ciphertext message X,
= (XS / = x.
There are two important security properties of public-key encryption.
First, given a ciphertext C, it is computationally infeasible to compute
Sthe corresponding plaintext message M= C without knowledge of the secret
key S. Second, given a public key P, it is computationally infeasible to
compute the corresro~ding secret key S. Thus public keys can be freely
distributed without ~isking the security of enciphered data.
2. The notation used here follows that suggested in [NeS77] rather than
that in [DilI76,RSA7S], wherein liEu and 1I[)11 denote encryption and
decryption transformations, respectively.
6A pair of hardwar~ keys (memory chips) implement a (public, secret)
key pair. The owner of the keys is told what character Seqllence is IIbunled
inll the memory chip of the public IIP_keyll so that he can -~ell it to his
associates. However, the sequence
IIS_keyll is not revealed to anyone,
"burned inll the memory chip
3including the key's owner.
of the secret
The encryptioI. device connects to a users personal computer (pc) and
has separate sockets for the P and S keys. In addition, it has a facility
for setting an alternative " soft ll public key, ALT_P, and a <:.oggle switch
for selecting between the P and ALT_P keys. The encryption device and
hardware keys could be built as a single unit. However, it is essential
that the device containing the memory chip for the S_key be detachable
fom the PC and be sufficiently small that the user can protect it as he
would any other keYe
Figure 1 shows how the device would be used to encipher and decipher
data transmitted between a user1s PC and the CF. A message X originating
from the user's PC is ~nciphered with the P_key (or the ALT_P key) before
it is transrndtted to ~he CF. A message Y originating from the CF is
deciphered with thp. S_key when it is received. All data transmitted
between a user's PC and the CF must pass through the encryption device.
No other communication lines between a PC and the CF are pe~tted, thus
assuring a user that his confidential data· is properly enciphered and
deciphered.
The purpose of th~ toggle switch and soft public key is to enable a
user to transmit mes~ages to the CF and other users on the network. Hhen
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Figure 1. The Encryption Mechanism.
Bthe caggie is set at the P_kcy, information transmitted [rom the user's
PC connot be deciphered by anyone but the user. In order to transmit
messages to the CF or anath,er user, the sender IlDJSt. set his toggle t.o
ALT_P and supply the receiver's public key. The receiver's key could
be supplied, Eor p.xarople, by a command issued from the userls pc. More_
over, while the toggle is set to ALT_P, software running on the PC can
set ALT_P to be the s~ne as P, freeing the user of the need to reset the
toggle to use his personal public key. However, this is ies5 secure than
enciphering with the hdrd P_key, as the user must rely on (possibly
borrowed) software to supply the correct key.
An important property of this mechanism is that the CF does not
keep a record of s~c~et keys. The key manufacturer may keep records of
keys in order to handle lost or stolen keys, but these could be securely
stored in a steel vault. It is primarily for this reason this system
uses public-key encryption rather than single-key encryption, such as the
Data Encryption Standard (DES) [NBS77]. Under single_key encryption,
the same secret key is used both for encryption and decryption, making
it necessary for th~ CF to maintain and safeguard lists of secret keys.
In order for the CF to transmit ciphertext to a user, it must know the
user's secret key. In order for two users to communicate, the CF must
generate and distribute a secret communication key. Thus, the security of
the system depends on the security of the key management facilities, violating
the premise that the users should not have to rely on the security mech_
anisms of the CF.
9A user may r~veal his public key to the eF, however. Since all
information arriv~ng at his personal computer is automatically deciphered
with his S_key, it also lnust be enciphered with his P_key in order to
appear in plaintext in his PC. If the user reveals his public key to
the eF, the CF can, for example, encipher programs requested by the user
before transmitting t'ilcm to the user1s pc.
However, it is not necessary for a user to give bis public key to
the eF, as the us~~ can perform the encryption himself. This works as
follows: the CF transmits plaintext message X, which is tacn deciphered
upon arrival at the us~rls PC, giving XS • The user then r~utes xS back
through his encryption device to get (XS)p = X (see Figure 2). Therefore,
a user need give his ~_key to the CF only if he wishes the CF to transmdt
data in ciphertext ~nd the data has not been previously enciphered (either
by the user hirnselt or some other user).
10
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To implement personal secrecy, the user sets the toggle switch of his
encryption device to his public P_key. Since all information transndtted
from his PC is autcmatically enciphered using his P_key, it is computationally
infeasible for anyone to decipher information outside of his PC without
acquiring his secret S_key. But the S_key is engraved in a memory chip
and there is TIC copy of it in the CF; thus a perpetrator must steal or
4duplicate it in order to decipher the data.
With this me~anlsm, a user can safely store (enciphered) secret
documents in the C~. No perpetrator will be able to break into the CF
and decipher the documents.
A user CQuid safely run software supplied by the CF on his PC without
fear of i1 Iltrojan horscll t.heft.. If the soft.ware package att.empt.ed to
t.ransmit the user',3 di\ta back t.o ita ownerJ t.he data would be automat.ically
enciphered with the user's keYJ rendering it useless to the owner of the
package.
Consequent.1YJ a compilerJ for example J could not st.eal proprietary
software under development J or an income tax program could not steal
confidential financial records. The mechanism can thus be used to implement
5
confined (or memoryless) subsystems [Lam71]. The mechanism does not J
4. Alt.ernatively, it may be possible for a perpetrat.or t.o rig an encryption
device to record secret keys. If this posed a serious threat. J it would
be necessary for a user to safeguard the encryption device he used as
well as the key. Thus there is same advantage to a single device con_
taining both t.he encrypt.ion algorithms and t.he memory chips implementing
the keys.
5. However, it. may be possible to leak information ov 'Icovert channels
"
; e.g.,
by encoding it in the rat.e or quantity of transmitt.ed ciphertext.
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however, safeguard data supplied (in plaintext) to programs run at the CF.
To safeguard data in this case requires sophisticated prot~ction mechanism5
within the CF.
13
Secure Cornmunicat~on and Sharing
Secure cCllulIl1I1=ation is achieved with end_to-end encryption; that is,
the sender enciphers the message before transmission and the receiver
deciphers the message upon receipt. Suppose users A and B wish to be
able to communicate securely through the CF. This is easily done if A
and B exchange their public keys PA and PB respectively. As suggested by
Diffie and Hellman ~DiH76J, A sends messages enciphered with PB to B;
similarly B sends messages enciphered with PA to A (see Figure 3). Secure
one_ way communication is achieved if either A or B transmits data enciphered
with the other's public key.
There is clearly no danger of an intruder intercepting snd deciphering
messages transmitted ~his way. To guard against the probl~m of replay, a
sequence number or time stamp can be inserted into a message before it is
enciphered.
The method can also be used to implement sharing of confidential files.
Suppose user A has a confidential file F stored in the CF and enciphered under
FA. To share F wi~h another user B, A requests a copy of F from the CF.
Since F is automaticaily deciphered under SA when it reaches A1s PC, A has
only to send it bac~ to the CF enciphered under PB in order that B, and only
B, be able to decipher it (see Figure 4). (A must also instruct the CF to add
this new version of F to B's file directory.) Should A updnte F and wish
toshare the updated version with B, the process would be repeated.
The important point in both cases is that all confidential information
travelling through the network or stored in the CF is enciphered. At no time
does the CF have acc~ss to plaintext or to the secret keys required to
decipher the information.
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The method can be used to implement secure signatures as described
by Diffie and HeUman [D1H76J; to send a signed message X to B, A first
deciphers X with h:='s secret key SA before transmi tHng it, enciphered
under Bis public kzy PB· When B receives the message, it is automatically
deciphered under SB' so that B has only to encipher it under PA to obtain
the original message and kn at" that it came from A (since only A could have
enciphered it under 3A) (see Figure 5).
As outlined above, the method suffers from the problem pointed out
by Saltzer [5a178J; B has no assurance that A did not loan, give away, or
lose his private key. This problem could be solved with more sophisticated
hardware. When a useL purchased a (P,S) key pair, his voice_print (or some
other identifying characteristic) could be recorded in the S~key. Activation
of the S_key would thar. somehow require the user to supply £I matching print.




































Fi~re 5. Message X Securely Signed by A and Transmitted to B.
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Interface with Ceilt:ral Facility
The CF is also equiped with a pair of keys and one or more encryption
devices. All incoming messages may be automatically
deciphered, although this is not required for security. However, the CF
must identify and decipher messages addressed to it. This could be done
by prefixing mess~~e6 to the CF with a fixed_format header identifying
the GF, the sende~, and the time of transmission (to guard against replay).
Upon receipt of a message, the CF would attempt to decipher the beginning
of the message. If the message begins with a recognizable hc.ader, the CF
would continue deciphering the message; otherwise, the CF would simply
route the message, in ciphertext, as directed by a previous command. For
example, a user A ~ishing to store a confidential file at the CF would
first send a request~ properly headed and enciphered under DCp • This would
be followed by the file, enciphered under DA•
The CF may provide Ildirectory assistancell for public keys of its
customers. If a user wished to make his key generally available, he could
list it with the CF. Alternatively, a user can have an unlisted key and
personally give it to his associates.
There is some ~isk associated with obtaining keys from the directory.
If the CF sends an incorrect key (either accidently or int~ntionally), the
recipient of the key may unknowingly encipher confidential messages that




I have outlined a scheme for implementing secure personal computing
in a large network with one or more central facilities~ The scheme is
based on the use uf a public-key encryption device and hardware keys in
the form of memory ~hips. Each user is responsible for protecting his
,
\
own data and need not rely on the security of the network. All confi_
dential data is enciphered before it is transmitted to the central facility
or another user on t~e network. The central facility is not responsible
for enciphering or de~iphering data and, therefore, is not given access
to either plaintext or the secret keys needed to decipher the ciphertext.
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